read the opinions of your classmates, and respond to at least two of your classmates’ postings. These posts can be as long or as short as you need in order to effectively make your points.

MATTHEW:

I believe that Carz Bazaar should not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its agents when those acts are outside of the scope of their responsibilities. First, the duties of an agent are specific enough so that any reasonable employee should know the purpose of requesting and transporting a company vehicle for the sole intent of supporting business operations. Employees have the responsibility of duty of care, obedience, accounting, and loyalty to the company in which they work for. Our readings on Agency and Liability say that employees should not act in a way that conflicts with the benefits of the principal. Employees should exercise due care and should obey the reasonable instructions of the principal. It also says that they should account for money handled by the agent for the principal. (Agency and Liability, n.d.). Personal use of a company vehicle is a direct violation of the obedience, loyalty, and duty of care responsibilities of an agent. I would also argue that the personal use of a company vehicle will require gas expenditure which the employee would not be accounting for.

Secondly, Gina Mitchell was supposed to act as the control authority to account for vehicles under her control and to prevent vehicle abuse. As an agent to Carz Bazaar, she had a responsibility to hold those same duties as Charles Wilson did. Had she acted in the best interest of the company, Mr. Wilson would not have been able to use the vehicle for personal errands.

Lastly, our readings use almost this exact example to demonstrate why a principal would not be held liable for agent actions outside of their scope. Agency and Liability says “If, however, the employee takes the company vehicle and goes on a personal errand that is not authorized, the employee is likely outside the scope of her employment. Suppose while running these errands she gets into an automobile accident that is her fault. The employer would be able to argue that the deviation from her duties as employee was frolic and detour and relieved her of liability for the employee’s tort” (Agency and Liability, n.d., p. 24). I would argue that it is a reasonable understanding that employees are not to use company vehicles for personal use and that Carz Bazaar did not give consent for either employee to make that justification.

There is a fine line between whether an employee is acting on behalf of the company or not. Had Gina Mitchell annotated that the car was going to be gassed up, or if Wilson had told police he was using the vehicle for company business, then Carz Bazaar would have been held liable. Wilson could have been just as much on the roadway to get gas or transfer the vehicle to another lot and caused the accident. Also, if the plaintiff can prove that it is a common practice for employees at Carz Bazaar to use the company vehicles for other personal errands while they are conducting business, then I believe that Carz Bazaar may have still been considered liable. This puts the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and I think that Carz Bazaar has a better chance of defending it.

Works Cited

Agency and Liability. (n.d.). 
UMGC. Retrieved from https://leocontent.umgc.edu/content/scor/uncurated/mba/2218-mba630/learning-resourcelist1/agency-and-liability.html?ou=1190745

ZACHARY:

I believe the judge will decide in of favor the plaintiffs in this case.

There is a principal-agent relationship in which Carz Bazaar is the principal and both Mr. Wilson and Ms. Mitchell are agents of the company. This agency is created by virtue of their employment and the scope of that agency is fairly wide: both individuals are entrusted to make decisions and carry out actions on behalf of Carz Bazaar within the context of their overall roles and positions, not just in specific instances (UMGC, 2024b).

That makes both of these employees general agents. As general agents and employees, their authority to act on behalf of the company is comparatively broad (broader than an independent contractor or a limited agent, for instance). Both certainly have their own, specific, job responsibilities (which is important), but because both also have general agency, they may be considered to be acting on behalf of the principal if a third party would reasonably assume that their role includes the authority for the actions they’re undertaking (UMGC, 2024b).

In this instance, Mr. Wilson has taken a company car, an act that is common to his role as an agent (UMGC, 2024a). It is true that he has taken the car for a personal reason, and that this likely constitutes a frolic and detour. His actions serve his own interests, not the business interests (frolic) and deviate from the standards and rules that govern his authority (detour) in that taking the car for personal reasons is expressly disallowed. In the course of this frolic and detour, Mr. Wilson has also breached several of his duties to the principal (duty of care, duty of obedience) (UMGC, 2024b). If this were where the scenario ended, I think the decision would be in favor of the defendants. The frolic and detour of the employee absolves the defendants of vicarious liability.

But there’s another agent to consider: Ms. Mitchell. There’s also a dynamic between these two agents that places one in a position of decision making authority over the other. Ms. Mitchell as the attendant in charge at the lot on the day of the incident (UMGC, 2024a) has the responsibility to provide access to company vehicles within what is acceptable to the principal and the obligation to track their issuance and use following company procedures. In some regards, Ms. Mitchell appears to have the authority, as an agent of the principal, to determine what uses of company vehicles are permissible.

In this instance, Ms. Mitchell is aware of the personal nature of the vehicle’s use, and issues the vehicle to Mr. Wilson anyway (UMGC, 2024a). This action, given Ms. Mitchell’s role, seems to ratify the personal use of the vehicle by the employee. While it might be argued that Ms. Mitchell has breached her duties to the principal (again duty of care and duty of obedience may be invoked) (UMGC, 2024b) in making this decision, however the fact pattern presented calls into question whether that is the case. Specifically, the fact pattern indicates that there is a great deal of variance in how the procedures for issuing and logging the use of cars are carried out. For example, the return time of cars is not always noted in the log, the keys are not always returned directly to an attendant, and whether or not a car will be returned can be changed by a phone call from management (UMGC, 2024a). These facts seem to indicate significant latitude is given to attendants to determine what is appropriate in terms of issuing vehicles and logging use. The fact that Ms. Mitchell’s concern that she might get in trouble is rooted in whether or not the car is returned, and not in the purpose of the car’s use (UMGC, 2024a), also seems to indicate that she believes she has the authority to issue the car in this circumstance–as long as it comes back. In essence the frolic and detour defense is derailed by the ratification of this use of the car by another agent, who is in a position of relative authority regarding the vehicle’s use (UMGC, 2024b). This exposes the company to vicarious liability.

References:

UMGC. (2024a). 
Carz Bazaar. Document posted in UMGC MBA 630 9047 online classroom, archived at https://leocontent.umgc.edu/content/umuc/tgs/mba/mba630/2241/course-resource-list/carz-bazaar.html?ou=1190745

UMGC. (2024b). 
Agency and Liability. Document posted in UMGC MBA 630 9047 online classroom, archived at https://leocontent.umgc.edu/content/scor/uncurated/mba/
2218-mba630/learning-resourcelist1/agency-and-liability.html?ou=1190745