21.Emerilistheownerofarestaurant.Hedecidestoraisethewagesofhisworkerseventhoughhefacesanexcesssupplyoflabor.Hisdecision a.mightincreaseprofitsifitattractsabetterpoolofworkerstoapplyforjobsathisrestaurant. b.willreducetheexcesssupplyoflabor. c.isanexampleofthebenefitsofaminimum-wagelaw. d.Alloftheabovearecorrect. 22.Michaeldecidestohiresomeadditionalworkersforhisroofingcompany.Theequilibriumwageis$17perhour.EfficiencywagetheorysuggeststhatitisreasonableforMichaeltooffer a.$17perhour. b.lessthan$17perhourbecausesomepeoplewouldbewillingtoworkforless. c.lessthan$17anhourtopreventshirking. d.morethan$17perhourinordertoattractabetterpoolofapplicants. 23.Rafaelisthenewlyappointedplantmanagerforacompanythatmanufacturesheadphones.Rafael’sseniorsupervisorstoldhimthattheoutputthefirmproduces,giventhenumberofworkersemployed,indicatesthatsomeworkersmaybeshirking.Accordingtoefficiencywagetheory,whatshouldhedo? a.payallworkersmorethantheequilibriumwagerate b.payallworkersbelowtheequilibriumwageratetomakeupforthelossfromshirking c.makesurethatworkersaregettingpaidexactlytheequilibriumwagerate d.firetheworkerswiththemostseniority 24.Afirmmaypayefficiencywagesinanattemptto a.reduceincentivestoshirk. b.reduceturnover. c.attractawell-qualifiedpoolofapplicants. d.Alloftheabovearecorrect. 25.Whichof the followingisnotareasonthatpayingefficiencywagesmayincreaseafirm’sprofit? a.Efficiencywagesincreaseworkerhealthandthereforeincreaseworkerproductivity. b.Efficiencywagesdecreaseworkerturnoverandthereforedecreasehiringandtrainingcosts. c.Efficiencywagesdecreaseworkershirkingandthereforeincreaseworkerproductivity. d.Efficiencywagesarebelowtheequilibriumwageratebutstillattractasufficientnumberofworkers. 26.ArianaistheCEOofacorporationthathiresnonunionlabor.Accordingtothetheoryofefficiencywages,ifshedecidestopayherworkersmorethanthecompetitiveequilibriumwage,then a.theprofitsofherfirmmightincrease. b.shewillfaceashortageoflabor. c.theturnoverofherworkersmayincrease. d.Noneoftheaboveiscorrect. 27.Threeemployershavejustifiedtheiractionsasfollows.Whoselogicisnotconsistentwiththelogicofefficiencywagetheory? a.Insteadofspendingmoneyonanelectronictimingsystemthatmonitorsworkerhours,Tomspendsanequivalentamountofmoneyonhigherwages. b.Dickpayshisworkerslessthantheequilibriumwagesothattheywillnothavethetimeormoneytolookforworksomewhereelse. c.Harrypayshisworkersinadevelopingcountrymorethanthegoingwagehopingthattheywillgetabetterdietandsobemoreproductive. d.Noneoftheaboveisconsistentwiththelogicofefficiencywagetheory. 28.Inwhichofthefollowingsituationsshouldafirmpayefficiencywages? a.Ahiringmanagercaneasilyjudgethequalityofapplicants,andafterworkershaveworkedforthefirmawhile,theytendnottolookforotherjobs. b.Ahiringmanagercaneasilyjudgethequalityofapplicants,andafterworkershaveworkedforthefirmawhile,theytendtolookforotherjobs. c.Ahiringmanagercannoteasilyjudgethequalityofapplicants,andafterworkershaveworkedforthefirmawhile,theytendtolookforotherjobs. d.Ahiringmanagercannoteasilyjudgethequalityofapplicants,andafterworkershaveworkedforthefirmawhile,theytendnottolookforotherjobs. 29.Accordingtothetheoryofefficiencywages,ifafirmstopspayingefficiencywagesitislikelytoseea(n) a.increaseinthenumberofjobapplicantsandanincreaseinhowlongworkersstayonthejob. b.increaseinthenumberofjobapplicantsandadecreaseinhowlongworkersstayonthejob. c.decreaseinthenumberofjobapplicantsandanincreaseinhowlongworkersstayonthejob. d.decreaseinthenumberofjobapplicantsandadecreaseinhowlongworkersstayonthejob. 30.Sectoralchangesindemand a.createfrictionalunemployment,whilefirmspayingwagesaboveequilibriumtoattractabetterpoolofcandidatescreatesstructuralunemployment. b.createstructuralunemployment,whilefirmspayingwagesaboveequilibriumtoattractabetterpoolofcandidatescreatesfrictionalunemployment. c.andfirmspayingwagesaboveequilibriumtoattractabetterpoolofcandidatesbothcreatestructuralunemployment. d.andfirmspayingwagesaboveequilibriumtoattractabetterpoolofcandidatesbothcreatefrictionalunemployment.